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REMARK
REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.t
UPON RECEIVING THE LEARNED HAND
MEDAL AT THE LAW DAY DINNER,
MAY 1, 2002tt
Two generations ago, in the midst of another war, Judge
Learned Hand memorably spoke of the spirit of liberty.' I think
it is fitting tonight, in these trying times, on the occasion of Law
Day, to pause and to reflect upon our precious liberty under law
and how it has endured. My brief message tonight is not
complicated. Our liberty endures because it has always been,
and must continue to be, tempered by a wise restraint.
Learned Hand gave eloquent expression to the idea of
restraint. I will say a few words about that and about the
circumstances in which he made his remarks. I will also touch
upon three types of restraint in the law.
The first restraint is the restraint on liberty itself-we are
not free, for example, to harm others. The second restraint is the
restraint on governmental power that is spelled out in the
t Chief Circuit Judge on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Formerly, Judge
John M. Walker, Jr. was a district judge for the Southern District of New York; an
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Operations; a partner at
Carter, Ledyard & Milburn in New York City, where he specialized in commercial
litigation; and an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York in the criminal division. Judge Walker is an adjunct professor at New York
University Law School, a visiting lecturer at Yale Law School, and on the teaching
faculty of the Institute of Judicial Administration's Appellate Judges Seminar. He
is a graduate of Yale College and the University of Michigan Law School.
,t This Article is based on remarks made by the Judge Walker upon receiving
the Learned Hand Medal at the Law Day Dinner on May 1, 2002.
1 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty Speech (May 1, 1944), in THE SPIRIT OF
LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189, 189-91 (Alfred A. Knopf
ed., 3d ed. 1960).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Constitution. The third restraint is judicial restraint. It is a
self-imposed restraint and it is of, particular importance on this
day, Law Day, and to this audience composed of accomplished
judges and lawyers. I believe this third restraint to be the most
critical of the three because it is the most vulnerable to abuse
and because it is so essential to the well-being of the republic.
Let me begin with a few words about Judge Learned Hand,
in whose name this award is given, and about the moment in
time at which he spoke of the spirit of liberty. Judge Hand is
widely considered to have been one of the four greatest judges of
the first half of the twentieth century. The other three, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo, and Louis Brandeis were
all Supreme Court Justices. Judge Hand's career was here in
the Second Circuit.
Learned Hand became a federal judge in 1909 and served for
fifty-two years, first on the district court and then on the court of
appeals.2 He made his mark as a great judge, not with a few
grand decisions, but because his passion for the law was felt in
every case and because he wrote his opinions with an almost
poetic clarity. Judge Henry Friendly, who sat with Learned
Hand in his last years, remembered the "great way in which
[Hand] dealt with a multitude of little cases, covering almost
every subject in the legal lexicon. Repeatedly he would make the
tiniest glow-worm illumine a whole field."3
Learned Hand's reputation as a judge shone brightly;
however, for most of his career it was largely confined to those
within the profession, particularly the bench and bar of the
Second Circuit. All that changed in May 1944 when Learned
Hand delivered his speech on the spirit of liberty.
The occasion was a patriotic naturalization ceremony in
Central Park for over 150,000 immigrants. It was attended by
hundreds of thousands of people, most of whom came to enjoy a
sunny Sunday in the park.4 Hand's brief speech, 519 words, was
widely publicized and Judge Hand became nationally known and
2 See Leonard P. Moore, Learned Hand: An Appreciation, 29 BROOK. L. REV. 2,
3 (1962).
3 Henry J. Friendly, Learned Hand: An Expression from the Second Circuit, 29
BROOK. L. REV. 6, 13 (1962), reprinted in HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 315
(1967).
4 For an account of Learned Hand's speech, see GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED
HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 547-52 (Alfred A. Knopf ed. 1994).
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admired for it. 5
Learned Hand's message on that spring day fifty-eight years
ago was that the spirit of liberty lies in the hearts of the men and
women of America and that, at its essence, American liberty
under law was a spirit of restraint-restraint on individuals and
on government alike.6 He made it clear, and I quote, that the
spirit of liberty "is not the ruthless, the unbridled will; it is not
freedom to do as one likes. That is the denial of liberty, and
leads straight to its overthrow." 7
This was a lesson that Judge Hand, and his listeners, knew
all too well. Fascism had conquered Europe; communism had
seized Russia; and Japanese militarism had subjugated the Far
East.
For Learned Hand, the ideological certainty of
totalitarianism was the antithesis of the spirit of liberty. As he
put it, "A society in which men recognize no check upon their
freedom soon becomes a society where freedom is the possession
of only a savage few; as we have learned to our sorrow."8 For
Judge Hand, the spirit of liberty was instead, at its core, "the
spirit which is not too sure that it is right."9 Even at a time
when America was flush with patriotic fervor, his message was
one of restraint.
The idea that liberty must be restrained so that it may
endure was, of course, not new to Learned Hand. It is the very
bedrock of our society of laws. It is the first of the three
restraints I am speaking about. Montesquieu explained the
paradox that we are only free when we accept the constraints of
the law. "Liberty is the right to do everything the laws permit;
[for] if one citizen could do what [the laws] forbid, he would no
longer have liberty because the others would likewise have this
same power." 10 Constraints on individual liberty were needed to
prevent harm to others-to have a society. 1 Liberty unchecked
5 See id. at 548.
6 See id. at 548-49.
7 Hand, supra note 1, at 190.
S Id.
9 Id.
10 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, pt. 2, bk. 11, ch. 3, at 155 (Anne M.
Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).
11 See id.; James Hart, The State and Human Freedom, in ASPECTS OF LIBERTY,
33, 37-38 (Milton R. Konvitz & Clinton Rossiter eds., 1958).
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would be anarchy. 2
But if liberty had to be constrained by government to
endure, what was to prevent government itself from becoming in
Hand's terms-"the ruthless, the unbridled will"13 that was the
very antithesis of liberty?
It was not enough that the preservation of liberty be
entrusted to the people. Tyranny is not the exclusive province of
kings. It was the experience of the ancients that democracy
unchecked also led to tyranny. Plato observed in the Republic
that democracy passes into despotism. 14 As James Madison
noted in Federalist Number 10, even the supporters of republican
government feared that the rule of the majority is "too unstable,
that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival
parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according
to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by
the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority."15
The greatest and most justified fear in the minds of the Framers
was the tyranny of the majority, which leads me to the second
type of restraint I wish to speak about.
The question was how to have majoritarian rule, on the one
hand, but not majoritarian intemperance and oppression, on the
other. The Framers responded to this dilemma by formulating,
in Alexander Hamilton's phrase, a new "science of politics." 16
Central to the Framers' idea of the necessary restraint on
majoritarian rule was that majority power had to be diffused and
separated among the various branches of the government. It
was Montesquieu, forty years earlier, who realized that the way
to check power was with power.17  He believed that an
overreaching ambition in one branch of government would be
countered by ambition in another branch, and a balance thereby
achieved.' 8 Through such a separation of powers, a democracy
12 See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 10; 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 563
(1998).
13 Hand, supra note 1, at 190.
14 See PLATO'S REPUBLIC 210-11 (G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett Publishing Co.
1974).
15 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
16 THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
17 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 10, pt. 2, bk. 11, ch. 4, at 155; see also id. pt. 2, bk.
11, ch. 6, at 157.
18 See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 10, pt. 2, bk. 11, ch. 6. For an additional
discussion of balance among the branches, see THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-24
[Vol.76:595
REMARKS ON LIBERTY
would endure, contrary to all prior experience, and it would
endure even if ran by, ordinary -people, with less than lofty
motives.19
It was the genius of the Framers to adopt Montesquieu's
principle of separation of powers and to adapt it to the peculiar
circumstances of America. The Federal Constitution would
divide the power among the different branches, and the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches would each bear a
different relationship to the popular majority, with the judiciary
not at all subject to the majority will. The branches would also
exercise different and often conflicting powers. In addition, a bill
of rights would protect individuals against governmental
oppression.
The Framers and the ratifying assemblies gave us a body of
law and rules in the Constitution that were full of checks and
restraints on power. But only time would tell whether these
restraints-the second type of restraint on which liberty
depends-would work.
This brings me to the third restraint. The success of this
experimental system of laws would depend on how well, over
time, the judiciary would function in the real, as opposed to the
theoretical world. In addition to the new experiment of checks
and balances, another "great improvement" in the science of
politics, in Hamilton's phrase, was an independent judiciary-
one in which judges held office during good behavior, and could
not be removed except by impeachment, and thus did not owe
allegiance to the people. 20
Over the past two centuries, the judiciary, unelected and
life-tenured, has proven itself to be uniquely capable of resisting
the pressures of public opinion. Starting with Marbury v.
Madison2' in 1803 and the great decisions of the Marshall Court,
the courts have fulfilled their promise to be the ultimate
protector against the tyranny of the majority. When the popular
majority, whether state or federal, enacts measures that violate
the tenets of the Constitution, the judiciary can strike them
down. The judiciary has turned out to be the ultimate guardian
of individual liberty.
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
'9 See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 10, pt. 2, bk. 11, chs. 2, 4.
20 THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, supra note 15, at 72.
21 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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All of this gives rise to an obvious question: Who will guard
the guardians? Who or what is to stop the "politically insulated"
branch of government, which is endowed with the power to
override the majority, from itself becoming a source of tyranny
under a counter-majoritarian banner? What is there to prevent
judges from abandoning their role as adjudicators and becoming
unelected legislators seeking to enact their own vision of the
public good, accountable to no one in the system of checks and
balances?
Who, then, will guard the guardians? Indeed, who can?
Owing to its adjudicatory role, the judiciary simply cannot do its
assigned job if it is subject to political constraints like the other
branches. It must be independent of the other branches. So if
the judiciary is to be restrained, it has to restrain itself-and
this it must do. The costs of not doing it are simply too great.
Let me explain why I think so.
In our country, the law commands respect and obedience
because it is seen and felt as emanating from the people. We are
taught this as children. This is true of constitutional law as well
as statutory law. If the laws govern our behavior, it is because,
as a people, we have consented to such laws and to such
government. We renew this consent with every election. The
consent of the governed cloaks the law with a moral authority.
It leads the people to respect the law. It explains, in great
measure, why the law is obeyed and why, when the law is
applied in courts and judgments are rendered, those judgments
are willingly, if not always happily, followed. Alexis de
Tocqueville spoke of the American people's affection for the law,
because it is their law and they know that if they do not like it,
there are ways to change it.22 This respect and affection for the
law is indispensable to the judicial function; but it is exceedingly
fragile.
Judicial lawmaking-by which I mean the making of judge-
made rules that fall outside the parameters of the meaning of
statutes and constitutional provisions, fairly determined-does
not have the moral authority that comes with the consent of the
governed. It is not accounted for in the constitutional system of
checks and balances because the Framers never expected judges
22 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, pt. 2, ch. 6, at 241 (J.P.
Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans., Perennial Library 1988) (1835).
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to legislate; rather they expected them to adjudicate.
So, when judges overstep their role and interpret the
Constitution broadly or stretch the meaning of statutes to favor
a policy outcome, they act outside of the very laws that they
must uphold. The result goes beyond creating uncertainty and
unpredictability in the law, although that is certainly one result.
Judicial overreaching erodes public respect, confidence, and
affection for the law; it weakens the law's moral authority; it
politicizes the judiciary; and, if it happens enough, it threatens
to undermine the legitimacy of the judicial function itself.
These are not abstract concerns. The effect of the public's
increasingly held view that the law is just politics by other
means is on display every day. Judicial vacancies go unfilled.
Nomination hearings are political battlefields. Opposition
research is done on the backgrounds of judicial nominees. The
reputations of good men and women are unfairly maligned. For
these reasons, those most qualified for judicial office are
becoming less interested in taking the job. After one recent set
of contentious hearings, one of my Second Circuit colleagues
stated flatly that he would never agree to be nominated for the
Supreme Court.
So, in addition to the first two restraints upon which liberty
depends, which I have already spoken of-the denial of freedom
to harm others and the checks on the political branches-I add
this third one: judicial restraint. I believe it poses the greatest
challenge because it relies not on external rules but on the
integrity of the judge and because it is so important.
Judicial restraint does not depend on ambition checking
ambition, as in the separation of powers. It depends on the
judge's own devotion to the law. It is this devotion to the law
that must restrain ambition. Judicial restraint compels us to
accept the political compromises inherent in the legislative
process, the inability of the legislature to legislate at all in some
areas, and the other frustrations of an imperfect system, as we
follow the path of the law. For those of us, as judges and
lawyers, who walk this path, the spirit of liberty is, as it was for
Judge Hand, a spirit of restraint.We are the trustees and caretakers of the Constitution and
the laws that are so essential to our liberty. It is easy to forget
this in the details of our daily tasks: the checking and re-
checking of the facts and all the other minutiae of a brief or
20021
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
opinion; the painstaking search for the exact words to say what
we mean and no more; and the sometimes awkward groping in
the dark as we struggle to ascertain the law and how it should
apply. Yet it is through these humble efforts and modest virtues
that we each do our part in preserving the legacy of the law that
began with the Framers-and the liberty it protects.
Through his tireless and often thankless labors in the law
over a lifetime, Judge Hand transmitted this legacy to his
successors; however, he did more than that. Judge Hand and the
great judges of our circuit who followed him, Henry Friendly,
Edward Weinfeld, and others have made it an honor and
privilege to serve on the bench and bar of the Second Circuit.
Though few can expect to reach the heights of a Hand or a
Friendly or a Weinfeld, all of us can do our best to transmit their
legacy unblemished to our successors. In this way, as lawyers
and judges, we may do our part to make it possible for the spirit
of liberty, thus constrained, to thrive and do its noble work.
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